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Remedying Discrimination: the Limits of the 
Law and the Need for a Systemic Approach 
DOMINIQUE ALLEN* 
Abstract 
Very fe,v discrimination complaints reach the courts each year. As 
with other civil litigation, the reasons for this include the cost of 
pursuing litigation and, particularly for complainants, the risk of 
losing or receiving less than the complainant could have negotiated 
prior. Drawing on interviews with la"wyers and non-legal advocates in 
Victoria and an analysis of successful cases in three jurisdictions, this 
article examines the remedies the court is likely to award in a 
successful discrimination complaint and considers the effect of this on 
the eradication of discrimination in society. A comprehensive 
examination of the remedies awarded in successful discrimination 
complaints in Victoria over a three year period shows that courts are 
most likely to order compensation at modest amounts and 
complainants are not regularly awarded their costs. A comparison 
with Queensland and the federal system reveals a similar experience. 
Even in those jurisdictions where wider remedies are available, courts 
rarely take the opportunity to make broad orders which could affect 
other similarly situated individuals or deter would-be respondents. 
vVhile it is necessary to remedy the complainant's experience, it is also 
necessary to address broader, svstemic discrimination and a 
compensation award cannot do this: Remedying discrimination with 
compensation is primarily a problem because it is reactive. 
Compensation does not address other instances of discrimination in 
society or achieve systemic change nor does it encourage compliance 
because the respondent is not required to take anticipatory action to 
prevent another complaint. Based on the interpretive principles and 
extensive remedies provided in South Africa's recent anti-
discrimination reforms and a study of remedies ordered by that 
country's Equality Courts, the article proposes reforms to Australia's 
anti-discrimination legislation to enable courts to make wider orders 
which target other instances of discrimination in addition to 
remedying the complainant's experience. 
* B Comm (CanbeITa) LLB(Hons) (ANU) PhD (Melbourne), Institute of Legal Studies, 
Australian Catholic University. This article draws upon research conducted for the 
project 'Improving the Effectiveness of Australia's Anti-discrimination Laws', which 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Discrimination will only be remedied in Australia if an individual 
victim recognises that the treatment they were subjected to was 
unlawful discrimination and then chooses to do something about it. 
The individual lodges a complaint at the statutory equality 
commission 1 in their jurisdiction or the Australian Human Rights 
Commission ('AHRC'). If the equality commission accepts the 
complaint, it will attempt to resolve it using Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, usually conciliation. If that is not successful, the 
complainant can ask the equality commission to refer the complaint 
for hearing by the relevant tribunaP or the Federal Court. Put si!llply, 
the onus is on the individual victim to 'name, blame and claim'.-' The 
vast majority of complaints are withdrawn or settled prior to hearing. 
Courts hear very few complaints each year and a large number are 
unsuccessfu1.4 Therefore, most instances of discrimination are settled 
behind closed doors with a confidential settlement agreement. The 
upshot of this process is that the courts have few opportunities to 
make a public order remedying discrimination that sets a benchmark 
for how discrimination ought to be remedied. 
The purpose of this article is to examine how courts are remedying 
discrimination. It is concerned with remedies ordered by courts in 
discrimination complaints5 and does not consider the outcomes 
reached at settlement or prior to hearing. 6 This analysis shows that 
courts predominantly remedy discrimination with compensation. 
Although compensation may address the victim's experience -
though possibly not their legal costs - it is an ineffective means of 
remedying discrimination in society. 
Part II discusses the nature of discrimination and argues that the 
Australian legal system has a limited understanding of discrimination. 
Discrimination is viewed as a one-off, isolated event, not as a wider 
problem or a symptom of an entrenched policy or practice. The 
complaint resolution process and the limited range of remedies 
available supports this understanding, as does the courts' reluctance to 
make wider orders. In order to ascertain how discrimination is 
4 
6 
The statutory agcncy is typically identified as a Commission, Authority or Board. For 
case ofrcference, 'equality commission' is used throughout. 
'Tribunal' and 'court' are used intcrchangeably exccpt in rcfcrcncc to a specific court 
or jurisdiction. 
See further William L F Felstincr, Richard LAbel and Austin Sarat 'The Emergence 
and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming' (1980-1981) 15 La\\' & 
Society Review 631. 
See further Part lI. 
Sexual harassment and vilification complaints have not been as difficult to enforce. 
They are considered herein only to illustratc that courts have taken a different approach 
to remedying these complaints. 
For this discussion, see Dominique Allcn. 'Behind the Conciliation Doors Settling 
Discrimination Complaints in Victoria' (2009) 18(3) Griffith Law Review 776, 788. 
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remedied in Australia, Part III analyses the remedies ordered in 
successful discrimination cases heard by the Victorian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal ('VCAT') during 2006 - 2008. This shows 
that the tribunal regularly orders compensation, even though other 
remedies may be sought or the evidence reveals systemic problems. 
This conclusion is supported by the opinions of a selection of 
solicitors, barristers and non-legal advocates who practice in 
discrimination law in Victoria. To triangulate this data, the Victorian 
experience is compared with Queensland and federal complaints, 
which reveals a similar experience. Having established that courts 
regularly remedy discrimination with compensation, Part IV sets out 
some of the problems with this approach. For instance, the likelihood 
of a modest compensation award may discourage the individual victim 
from proceeding with their complaint, particularly because it may not 
cover their legal fees. Furthermore, remedying discrimination with 
compensation poses problems for eradicating discrimination in 
society primarily because it is reactive and does not remedy the 
situation of similarly situated individuals. An examination of whether 
courts generally order wider remedies establishes that they do not 
take a systemic approach to remedying discrimination. 
The relatively modern anti-discrimination legislation in South Africa 
provides an alternative. South Africa's non-employment 
discrimination legislation provides a wide range of remedies and 
courts have been inclined to make broader orders which go beyond 
the individual parties. Based on an examination of the South African 
experience, Part V argues that Australian courts should be required to 
make a systemic order, in addition to remedying the complainant's 
experience. It is acknowledged that the South African legislation does 
not impose a positive requirement on courts but given the country's 
history, it is doubtful that this would have been necessary; courts have 
willingly taken a systemic approach. The Australian experience is 
quite different. Courts have taken a formalistic approach to equality 
and viewed discrimination in an individualistic fashionJ Given this 
history, Part VI argues that remedying discrimination systemically 
should not be left to the court's discretion; the court should be 
required to make a wider order. The creative ways that the South 
African courts have used their remedial powers to tackle other 
instances of discrimination is used to illustrate this type of approach. 
See eg PUl'vis v New South Wales [2003] 217 CLR 92. This is discussed further in Part 
IL 
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II DISCRIMINATION, EQUALITY AND REMEDIES IN 
AUSTRALIA 
A Discrimination Conceptuanv 
The objective of Australia's various anti-discrimination laws is to 
address discrimination and promote equality of opportunity.s This is 
achieved by prohibiting direct and indirect discrimination on a range 
of attributes, such as race, gender and impairment, in numerous areas, 
such as employment and education.9 By prohibiting discrimination, 
the law intends to remove unfair barriers that prevented marginalised 
groups from competing, thereby ensuring that people are judged on 
merit, not according to irrelevant characteristics. Therefore, the 
purpose of the law is to ensure that likes are treated alike, which is the 
essence of formal equality. This approach is concerned with 
regulating the process, not the outcome. 1O It assumes that once unfair 
barriers are removed, people can compete fairly, ignoring the fact that 
members of marginalised groups were denied the opportunity to 
obtain meritorious characteristics to enable them to compete. J1 
Consequently, an instance of discrimination is seen as a one-off, 
isolated event between the individual parties, not as a complex web of 
entrenched practices of which the individual complaint is only the 'tip 
of the iceberg' . 
B Resolving Complaints 
This understanding of discrimination is reflected in the way the legal 
system deals with discrimination complaints; an individual 
discrimination complaint is not perceived as indicative of a systemic 
problem, so the legal system addresses discrimination on a case-by-
case basis. Enforcing the law is the complainant's responsibility and 
they do so by lodging a complaint at an equality commission. If the 
complaint is accepted, the equality commission will attempt to resolve 
it, usually through conciliation. If conciliation is not successful, the 
complainant can ask the equality commission to refer the complaint to 
the tribunal for hearing. Very few complaints are decided at hearing; 
most are settled, withdrawn or struck out on procedural grounds. 12 
The equality commissions cannot advise or assist the complainant, 
This is an objective of the law in the Australian Capital TeITitory. Queensland, 
Victoria. the NOlthern TeITitory and Westel11 Australia. 
For example, in Victoria discrimination is prohibited on a range of attributes. including 
race, sex. agc, impairn1cnt, marital status and religious belief in a range of areas, such 
as employment. education and the provision of goods and services: see Equal 
Opportunity Act 1995 (Vie) ('EOAV') s 6 and Part 3. 
10 The alternative is substantive equality, whieh rcquires equalising the starting point or 
the outcome. 
liOn the various conceptions of equality, see Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Lal1' 
(Oxford University Press, 2002) Chapter J. 
12 There are many reasons for this but it is outside the scope of this article to consider 
them. See further Alien, above n 6, 777-780. 
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nor do they play a role in enforcement, although some can appear in 
litigation, either by intervening or acting as an amicus curiae. 
Therefore, discrimination which is not complained about goes 
undetected and the things that the law cannot - and thus does not -
challenge are seen as 'normal' and part of the accepted way of doing 
things. Thornton says of this system, the result is that 'the individual 
symptoms of the disease alone can be addressed, and never the 
causative factors within the body politic.'13 
C Available Remedies 
If a discrimination complaint is successful at hearing, there are three 
remedies courts can award which are common to each jurisdiction: 
directing the respondent not to repeat or continue the unlawful 
conduct; requiring the respondent to perform a specified act to 
redress the complainant's loss; and financial compensation. Two 
jurisdictions set an upper limit on compensation awards in 
discrimination complaints of $40,000. H In some jurisdictions, the 
court can also vary or declare. void an agreement made in 
contravention of the legislation. b Other available remedies are 
reinstatement,16 the payment of a fine,li a public or a private apology 
made by the respondent1S or requiring the respondent to implement 
programs to eliminate discrimination. 19 The Commonwealth and 
Tasmanian legislation also contain a 'catch-all' power under which 
the court can make any order that it deems appropriate."o Three 
jurisdictions impose restrictions on the orders tribunals can make in 
representative complaints: in the ACT and Western Australia, an 
award of damages is prohibited in a representative complaint21 and in 
'Vestern Australian and New South 'Vales, the tribunal is prevented 
13 Margaret Thornton, 'Revisiting Race' in Racial Discrimination Act 1975: A Review 
(Australian Government Publishing Service, 1995) 81, 84. 
14 Eqllal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) s 127(b)(i) ('EOAWA') caps the maximum award 
at S40.000, so does the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) s 108 ('ADANSW'). The 
latter has remained the same since 1982 when it was increased to keep it in linc with 
the District Court limit: New South Walcs Law Reform Commission, Review of the 
Anti-Discrimination Act 1977, Report No. 92 (1999), 10.21. In its recent review of the 
state's legislation, the Western Australia Equal Opportunity Commission 
recommended that the government remove the limit in the EOA W A: W cstcm 
Ausn'alia Equal Opportunity Commission, Review of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 
(2007),54. 
15 ADANSW s 108(2)(1); Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 209(1)(h) ('ADAQ'); 
Anti-Discrimination Act (NT) s 88(1)(d) (,ADANr); EOAWA, s 127(b)(iv); Anti-
Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) s 89(1)(1) ('ADAr). 
16 Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 46PO(4)(c) (,AHRC Act'); 
ADANT, s 88(2)(a); ADAT, s 89(1)(c). 
17 ADAT, s 89(1)(e). 
18 ADANSW, s 108(2)(d); ADAQ, s 209(1)(d), (e); AD ANT, s 89. 
19 ADAQ, s 209(1)(1). 
20 AHRC Act, s 46PO(4); ADAT, s 89(1)(h). 
21 Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) s I 02(2)(b )(iii) (,DAACr); EOA WA, s 127(b)(i). 
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from ordering a respondent to perform any act to redress any loss 
suffered by the complainants in a representative complaint.22 
Courts predominantly order narrow remedies, usually compensation, 
as discussed in Part n. This is due to the law's limited understanding 
of the nature of discrimination: if discrimination is perceived of as an 
isolated event, then it follows that it is only necessary to remedy the 
unlawful behaviour, rather than seek to change the entrenched 
policies or practices of which the one-off event is symptomatic. 
However, within the individual complaints framework, it is possible 
for courts to encourage systemic change through the remedies that 
they order. The discussion of South Africa in Part IV shows how such 
an approach works in practice. It is also worth noting that remedies 
were not always used so restrictively by Australian courts. Some of the 
most significant remedies were ordered by courts in Victoria. In two 
landmark decisions, VCAT's predecessors made orders which 
extended beyond the parties to the complaint. In liVaters, the 
Victorian government was ordered to review its new ticketing system 
on trams and refrain from implementing a public transport proposaU3 
In ~Vardle.v, Ansett, a national airline, was ordered to employ the 
female complainant as a trainee Rilot.H Both orders were subsequently 
upheld by the High Court.-) Furthermore, in the "Vorthland 
Secondary College case, the then Equal Opportunity Board ordered 
the Victorian government to re-oR~n a school,21> which was upheld by 
the Victorian Court of AppeaUi Systemic orders are now less 
common, as discussed in the next section, which suggests that to 
achieve broader change, the law needs to deal with discrimination 
differently. This article argues that courts should be required to 
remedy unlawful behaviour in a systemic way, as outlined in Part IV. 
III A COMPARISON OF REMEDIES AWARDED IN THREE 
AUSTRALIAN JURISDICTIONS 
The first part of this section is an examination of the remedies 
ordered by VCAT in each successful case heard in the Anti-
Discrimin;tion List over a three year period. This establishes that 
VCA T predominantly orders compensation. Case analysis is 
compared with the perceptions of representatives practicing in 
Victoria, which suggests that not only is compensation the most 
22 EOAWA. s 127(b)(iii); ADANSW. s 108(2)(c). Unfortunately. in its recent review of 
Western Australia's legislation. the Equal Opportunity Commission did not suggest 
amending this: above n 14. 
23 Tf!alers \' Public Transport Corporation (1990) EOC 92-294. The order \vas made 
pursuant to s 46 of the Equal Opporlllnil)' Act i984 (Vie) which is similar to EOA V. s 
136(a)(i). 
24 Wardley v Ansell Transport industries (Operations) Pty Lld (1984) EOC 92-002. 
25 Waters v Public Transport COIporation (1991) 173 CLR 349; Ansefl Transport 
industries (Operatiolls) Pty Ltd v Wardley (1980) 142 CLR 237. 
26 Silll1apan If Victoria (1994) EOe [92-567J. 
27 Victoria v Sinllapan (II/o 2) [1995] 2 VR 242. 
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common order made, it is often much less than what the complainant 
could have settled for and may not cover their legal fees. To 
determine whether it is an anomaly, Victoria is co~pared with 
Queensland and the federal system. 
A Remedies in Victoria 
The Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vi c) does not provide courts with 
any guidance about how to remedy unlawful discrimination. The Act 
empowers VCAT to make one or more of the following orders: 
an order that the respondent refrain from committing any further 
contravention of this Act in relation to the complainant; 
an order that the respondent pay to the complainant within a specified 
period an amount the Tribunal thinks fit to compensate the complainant 
for loss, damage or injury suffered in consequence of the contravention; 
an order that the respondent do anything specified in the order with a view 
to redressing any loss, damage or injury suffered by the complainant as a 
result of the contravention.28 
VCAT can also grant an injunction or make a declaration.29 Each 
subsection refers to 'the complainant' which suggests that remedies 
are only intended to address the individual harm. Thus, on the face of 
it, the power to do anything other than redressing the complainant's 
experience is absent. 
Tribunal Orders 2006 - 2008 
VCAT handed down a total of 129 decisions in the Anti-
Discrimination List from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2008. Fiftv-
four of those decisions were in response to procedural applicatiol~s, 
such as strike out applications and costs orders, and 37 related to 
exemption applications. Of the 38 remaining, 14 related to sexual 
harassment and the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vie). 
Therefore, 24 decisions were handed down after a substantive hearing 
of a discrimination complaint during those three years, which 
constitutes 19 percent of all decisions. Discrimination was found not 
proven in 16 of those cases, meaning 66 percent of cases were 
unsuccessful. 
VCAT ordered compensation in six of the eight complaints in which 
discrimination was proven.30 The compensation awards ranged from 
$2,000 to $83,368.83, as illustrated by Figure 1. The average 
compensation award was $35,309.31, the median was $19,842.5. The 
cases in the numerical order they appear below are: Deckert y 
Victorian Institute of Dryland Agriculture,31 Beasley y State of 
28 EOA V. s 136(a). VCAT can also find the complaint proven but decline to take any 
fUl1her action: s 136(b). 
29 Victorian Civil and Administrarive Trib/lnal Act 1998 (Vic) ss 123-124 ('VCA T Act"). 
30 Sce below Figure 1. 
31 [2006] VCAT 299. 
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Victoria/ 2 lViorgan, v Dancen Enterprises Pty Ltd,33 King v JVike 
Australia Pty Ltd/' Duma v lHader International Pty Ltd,3) and 
Turner v State of Victoria. 36 
Figure 1: VCAT 
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Awards: 2006 - 2008 
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The second highest award of $82,000 in Turner v State of Victoria 
was reduced to $50,500 on appeaU7 Compensation was ordered for 
loss of income and other employment related entitlements. In Duma 
v iViader International Pty Ltd, ~e compensation order included 
$4,000 for humiliation and distress.'s In Deckert v -Victorian Institute 
of Dryland Agriculture, the complainant was awarded $20,000 for the 
stress, depression, anxiety and humiliation suffered as a result of the 
respondent's breach of the EOA v. 39 
Of those cases in which compensation was not ordered, in one case, 
the respondent was ordered to offer the complainant the choice 
between transfer of employment to an equivalent position at a 
different location or severance pay.40 No further action was ordered in 
the other caseY In two cases, compensation was awarded along with 
another remedy: a respondent was ordered to undertake equal 
opportunity training at the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human 
Rights Commission (,VEOHRC') 42 and a respondent was ordered to 
32 [2006J VCA T 1050. 
33 [2006] VCAT 2145. 
34 [2007) VCAT 70. 
35 [2007) VCAT 2288. 
36 [2008]VCAT161. 
37 State of Victoria v Turner [2009] VSC 66. 
38 Duma v Mader International Pty Lld [2007J VCAT 2288. 
39 Deckert v Victorian Institute of DIY land Agriculture [2006J VCAT 299. 
40 Brunsch v Venture Mould and Engineering Australia Pty Lld [2008] VCAT 920. 
41 Mangan v Melbourne Cricket Club [2006J VCAT 73. 
42 Morgan v Dancen Enterprises PZv Lld [2006] VCAT 2145. 
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do something to redress the complainant's 10ss.-I3 The complainant 
sought an apology in one case, but it was not granted because the 
VCAT Member considered the compensation award enough to 
sufficiently demonstrate how unfavourably the Tribunal viewed the 
respondent's conduct.-I-I 
In half of the successful cases during 2006 - 2008, compensation vvas 
the only remedy ordered. It is necessary to examine those cases 
further to ascertain whether the tribunal could have awarded a wider, 
systemic remedy and to suggest other suitable remedies. Two cases 
were instances of discrimination in employment on the basis of 
impairment.-I5 In Duma v Nlader International Pty Ltd, the 
complainant sought reinstatement but it was not granted because 
Deputy President McKenzie thought it was not appropriate as the 
relationship had broken down and it would be futile to attempt to 
restore it.-I6 In Deckert v Victorian Institute of Dryland Agriculture, 
the complainant had resigned, so reinstatement was no longer 
appropriateY It could be argued that these cases were not 
symptomatic of systemic problems and were isolated instances of 
unlawful behaviour that the parties were unable to resolve 
satisfactorily earlier in the complaint handling process. \Vithout 
knowing whether either respondent was a 'repeat offender',-I8 that is 
what the evidence tendered in both cases suggests. However, as 
discussed in Part I, that is the nature of the complaint resolution 
process used in Australia: it deals with the individual instance, making 
it difficult to identify the systemic aspects. Given this, presumably 
every case would benefit from a wider order to some degree. In both 
of the aforementioned cases, the unlawful conduct occurred in an 
employment context and resulted in the break-down of the 
employment relationship. Therefore, VCAT could have ordered an 
audit of the respondents' policies and procedures to determine 
whether they are compliant with the EOAV or ordered the 
respondents to attend training provided by the VEOHRC. 
43 Turner l' State of Victoria [2008] VCAT 161. 
44 King l' Hike Australia Pty Ltd [2007] VCA T 70. 
45 Deckert v Victorian institllle of Dryland Agricullllre [2006] VCAT 299; DumCl v 
Mader international Pt)' Ltd [2007] VCAT 2288. 
46 Dlllna v lv/ader internmional Pt)' Ltd [2007] VCAT 2288. [93]. 
47 Deckert v Department of Primary Industry [2005] VC AT 2138. [7]. 
48 The cun-ent complaint handling system makes it impossible to asceltain whether a 
respondent is a repeat offender because complaints resolved prior to hearing are 
confidential and the terms of settlement may be couched in such a way that the 
respondent does not admit liability. It is not suggested that either of these respondents 
are repeat offenders but it is noted that studies have found that repeat offenders are 
common. For example. Hunter and Leonard found that some respondents were 
repeatedly involved in the complaints process: Rosemary Hunter and Alice Leonard. 
'The Outcomes of Conciliation in Sex Discrimination Cases' (Working Paper No 8, 
Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, University of Melbourne, 1995) 5-
6. Furthermore, a complainant solicitor and a complainant banister that the author 
interviewed had run cases against the same respondents. Some were state government 
departments. 
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King r Nike Australia Pty Ltd is also an employment discrimination 
complaint but on the basis caring responsibilities. The complainant 
was still employed by the respondent and sought to be appointed to 
an equivalent position to what she had held prior to taking maternity 
leave. As such a position was already occupied, VCA T could not make 
that order.49 However, it may have been appropriate for VCAT to 
order an audit of policies, particularly those relating to employees 
with caring responsibilities. Senior Member "\i\Talker noted that the 
respondent's directors would probably further consider the issues 
raised during the hearing and change procedures accordingly but 
declined to order respondent to do this.50 
The Tribunal took a similar approach in the final case, Beasley v State 
of Victoria. Deputy President McKenzie found that the school the 
respondent operated had used a less effective method of non-written 
communication to instruct the complainant, who was profoundly deaf, 
which limited his participation and opportunities for participation in 
the classroom.51 Deputy President McKenzie said that evidence had 
raised numerous problems with the respondent Department's 
program for students with disabilities, such as how it assesses the 
needs of individual students, funding allocations and the training 
teachers receive. She urged the respondent to review these matters 
but did not order it to, even though the evidence highlighted systemic 
problems. 52 Therefore, the last two cases sU<Tgest that even when the 
evidence reveals systemic problems, the tribunal will not order the 
respondent to do something to address it; it prefers to make a 
suggestion that the respondent can then consider. It is for this reason 
that the approach suggested in Part IV does not leave the tribunal 
with any discretion in relation to systemic remedies. 
2 Representatives' Perspectives 
Twenty-four solicitors, barristers and non-legal advocates (referred to 
collectively as 'representatives') who practice in discrimination law in 
Victoria were interviewed. A mix of those who predominantly 
represent complainants and respondents participated. 53 Interviews 
were conducted as part of a larger study on the effectiveness of anti-
discrimination laws,S-! so data was collected about the full spectrum of 
the complaint resolution process in Victoria. 55 The v"'EOHRC 
participated as an industry partner of the larger study. Its participation 
included identifying solicitors and non-legal advocates who regularly 
represent parties at the v"'EOHRC and inviting them to participate in 
49 King v Nike Australia p(V Ltd [2007] VCAT 70, [142]. 
50 Ibid[151]. 
51 [2006] VCAT 187. 
52 Beasley \. Department a/Education and Training [2006] VCAT 187, [182]-[187]. 
53 Eleven regularly represented complainants, 10 regularly represented respondents and 
three banisters represented both parties. 
54 ARC Linkage Project Grant (no. LP0455754) on 'Improving the Effectiveness of 
Australia's Anti-Discrimination Laws'. 
55 See also data reported in Alien, above n 6. 
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the interviews. Two of those solicitors and a barrister identified 
barristers who regularly represent parties in discrimination matters 
and therefore had professional experience relevant to the study. The 
data reported in this article is confined to questions pertaining to 
remedies. Its purpose is to provide another perspective about how 
remedies are awarded by VCAT and to illuminate some of the 
problems with the Tribunal's approach. 
Some representatives credited VCAT with wide powers to remedy 
discrimination. One described its powers as 'unfettered'. They said 
that the problem was that VCAT does not use its powers. According 
to most representatives, VCAT predominantly orders compensation. 
A solicitor who had practiced in anti-discrimination law in Victoria 
for 20 years did not recall an order for training. A complainant 
barrister recalled a couple of orders which included an apology. Other 
representatives concurred that while VCAT is empowered to make 
creative orders, such as for reinstatement, it does not do so, nor does 
it order the respondent to remedy the situation. 
In regard to the amount of compensation ordered, various 
representatives described awards as 'very miserable', 'a sick joke', 
'chicken feed' and, from the respondent's perspective, compensation 
was described as 'ignorable'. It was one representative's opinion that if 
respondents thouo-ht that acting discriminatorily was going to hurt 
their business and affect their bottom line, then relying on financial 
compensation to remedy discrimination may be effective, but at 
present the awards are low enough to fall within the respondent's risk 
management budget. In other instances, the fear of a compensation 
award does not deter the respondent from litigating. For example, a 
complainant barrister recalled that in a case where a state government 
department spent more than $1 million defending a complaint, the 
compensation order made against the department was for $20,000, 
which did not cover the complainant's legal fees. 
Most significantly, VC;\ T's compensation awards were described as 
being 'out of step' with what complainants can negotiate at 
settlement.56 A complainant barrister had recently settled three 
complaints for amounts on par with the award in McKenna '5 case. In 
that case the compensation award was $125,000, whic;p. remains a high 
watermark for compensation in this jurisdiction.'! As the above 
analysis shows, there were no equivalent compensation orders in 2006 
- 2008. Therefore, complainants who proceed to hearing run the risk 
56 Thomton found the same occuning in NSW two decades ago: although COUl1 ordered 
compensation was capped at S40.000. complainants had obtained S50,000 or more at 
conciliation: Margaret Thomton, 'Equivocations of Conciliation: The Resolution of 
Discrimination Complaints in Australia' (1989) 52 Modern Law Review 733, 741. 
57 In State of Victoria v McKenna [1999] VSC 310 the complainant was awarded 
S 125.000 which was not ovcl1umed by the Supreme Court. That baJTister noted that it 
'stands alone as a reasonably high award'. It should be noted that in McKenna. sexual 
harassment was found as well as sex discrimination. Sexual harassment complaints 
typically receive higher compensation awards than discrimination complaints. 
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that the tribunal may award them less in compensation than they 
could have negotiated earlier but if they are unsuccessful, they will 
have accrued legal fees and may also be subject to a costs order. The 
relationship of low compensation awards and costs is worth examining 
in detail. 
3 Compensation .4wards and Costs 
The intention in the anti-discrimination jurisdiction is that each side 
bears their own costs,58 thereby encouraging complainants to litigate 
complaints witho.ut the risk of paying the respondent's costs if they 
are unsuccessfup9 The costs orders made bv VCAT in those 24 
complaints which reached a substantive heari~g in 2006 - 2008 are 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: VC AT Costs Orders: 2006 - 2008 
Costs not 
mentioned, 11 
Respondent 
awarded costs, 2 
In the eight successful discrimination cases discussed above, the 
complainant was awarded costs in only one case and that was due to 
the public service he had undertaken in bringing a discriminatory 
membership rule of the Melbourne Cricket Club to the court's 
attention.60 Costs were reserved in four cases and at the time of 
writing, there was no published decision about whether they were 
ordered.61 There was no order in relation to costs in the remaining 
three cases. However, in the 16 unsuccessful cases, costs were reserved 
in half of them and in two cases, the complainant was ordered to pay 
58 See eg YCAT Act, s 109 and TlIrner v State of Victoria [2008] YCAT 161. 
59 This approach is common to the States and Territories and the federal system. 
However, federally if the complaint does not resolve at conciliation therc is a costs 
jeopardy. The Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth), s 79 gives the court the discretion 
to award costs in discrimination proceedings. Complainant representatives cited this as 
onc of the disadvantages of the federal system. 
60 ivfangal1 l' Melbollrne Cricket C/lIb [2006] YCAT 73, [60]. The rule was introduced to 
address an historic wrong of there being less female members of the club but President 
Morris found that once the situation was remedied, the rule was discriminatory: 
}.Iangan v Melbollrne Cricket C/lIb [2006] YCAT 792. 
61 The exception is the TlIrner matter, which was successfully appealed, although leave to 
appeal was granted on the condition that the State paid the complainant's reasonable 
costs of the appeal: State of Victoria v TlIrner [2009] YSC 66. 
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the respondent's costs.6c Overall, this does not suggest that VCAT is 
ordering costs to either party as a matter of course, but that creates 
another problem for the complainant: the only way they can recoup 
their legal expenses is through their compensation award. 
A complainant barrister said that for those who are successful at 
hearing, their compensation awards dissolve in legal fees because 
VCA T is unwilling to award costs against the respondent. Another 
barrister provided an example of a complainant who was awarded 
$2,500 in compensation and $3,500 for costs because the respondent 
had unnecessarily prolonged the trial. The barrister said that since 
they received both amounts, the complainant 'broke even' because 
they then had enough money to cover their legal fees. A union 
advocate recalled representing a union member who had to settle 
their complaint for $3,000 compensation because the union could not 
finance their members to take complaints to hearing, regardless of the 
complaint's merits. In this example, the union estimated that it would 
cost the complainant between $15,000 and $20,000 in legal fees to 
take it further. The advocate advised the complainant that it was too 
risky for them to spend that amount of money with the possibility of 
ending up in debt at the conclusion of the hearing. A complainant 
barrister recalled instances of clients who had mortgaged their home 
or borrowed money to fund their case. The complainant's difficulty in 
recouping costs also affects the amount of pro bono work members of 
the legal profession do. Two complainant barristers said that they find 
it difficult to do as much pro bono work as they would like to on 
meritorious complaints; although they can do some work pro bono, 
they also need to be paid for some and they are unlikely to recoup 
their costs through the complainant's compensation award. 
B Comparison of Remedies Ordered in Victoria, Queensland and 
Federally 
This section compares the cases heard in Victoria in 200i with those 
heard in Queensland and federally. Queensland was chosen for 
comparison because it has a similar population to Victoria63 and in 
200i it still had a specialist tribunal for hearing discrimination 
complaints.6-1 Furthermore, the ADAQ contains extensive, 
62 Mihelcic v Toll Tasmania [2007] VCAT 1312; Omerspahic v Fermax Pty Lld [2008] 
VCAT 1937. 
63 In December 2007. the populations of Victoria and Queensland were 5.246,100 and 
4.228.300 respectively: <http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/3101.0/> at 17 
September 2008. 
64 Namely, the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal. The Tribunal was amalgamated into the 
new Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, which commenced operation on 1 
December 2009. 
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unrestricted remedies,65 so it IS useful to consider whether these 
variables had an effect.66 
There were 32 substantive hearings in the tribunals in Victoria and 
Queensland and the Federal Magistrates Court and Federal Court in 
2007.67 Discrimination was proven in only five of those cases. In each, 
the court ordered compensation, although the legislation in each 
jurisdiction permits the court to make other orders. Figure 3 presents 
the compensation orders. Those cases in the numerical order they 
appear below are: Duma v iVIader Internatjonal Pty Ltd;68 King v 
Nike Australia Ptv Ltd;69 111 v A and U;/o Forest TT Queensland 
Health;!! and Raivcliffe TT lVorthern Sydney Central Coast Area 
Health Service.72 • 
Figure 3: Compensation Orders in 2007 
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The average compensation award was $11,297.40, the median was 
$9,000. Both the highest and lowest compensation orders were made 
by VCA T. Costs were awarded in two decisions, AE TT A and U and 
Forest v Queensland Health. In 2008, the respondent successfully 
appeal.~d the latter decision and the complainant was ordered to pay 
costs.') This reveals a similar pattern to the Victorian experience: 
65 ADAQ. s 209. CfDAACT. s102; ADANSW, s 108; EOAWA. s 127 which restrict the 
remedics available to representative complaints and, in regard to the lattcr two. cap the 
compensation available. 
66 New South Wales is also comparable to Victoria. but the AHRC's only office is in 
Sydney, which most probably affects the number of complaints made under the State 
scheme. 
67 Decisions were soureed from Austlii. LexisNexis and the individual courts' wcbsites. 
68 Duma v Mader i11lematianal Pty Lld [2007] VCAT 2288. 
69 King v Nike Australia p(V Ltd [2007] VCAT 70. 
70 [No 2] [2007] QADT 8. 
71 [2007] FCA 1236. 
T.!. [2007] FMCA 931. 
73 The State a/Queensland (Queensland Health) v Che Forest [2008] FCAFC 96. 
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there were few successful discrimination complaints during 2007 in 
the three jurisdictions and they were all remedied with compensation. 
However, compensation awards were at much lower amounts than in 
comparison to Victoria and the complainant was awarded costs in 
fewer than half of the complaints. 
Systemic remedies were not ordered in any of these cases; 
compensation was the only remedy ordered. "In two case~, the 
complainant sought an apology but in both, it was not granted. I" It is 
necessary to consider whether the court could have ordered a wider 
remedy 'in the circumstances. Duma v i11ader International Pty Ltd 
and King v Nike Australia Pty Ltd were considered above. It is not 
possible to ascertain whether two of the remaining three cases were 
isolated instances of discrimination or symptomatic of systemic 
problems. In i11 v A and U, the complainant was refused service and 
ridiculed by the proprietor and an employee of a grocery store on the 
basis of sex and lawful sexual activity. In Rawclif{e v Northern Sydney 
Central Coast Area Health Service, the complainant was subject to 
discrimination in employment on the basis of impairment, including 
the failure to accommodate his medical condition in rostering his 
work hours. In both instances, the court could have ordered equal 
opportunity training and education to curb the likelihood of future 
customers or employees of either respondent being subject to such 
conduct. 
In Forest TT Queensland Health, Collier J found that the respondent 
had acted unlawfully by failing to allo'w the complainant's assistance 
animal to accompany him into two hospitals which the respondent 
operated. Justice Collier noted two systemic problems. First, one of 
the hospitals did not have appropriate procedures in place to identify 
whether animals are being used for assistance and should be allowed 
onto the premises.!5 Second, the respondent did not provide adequate 
guidance for staff in one of its hospitals about anti-discrimination 
lawsJ6 However, Collier J did not order the respondent either to 
review its procedures or to train its staff in their legal responsibilities, 
as would have been appropriate in the circumstances. 
IV PROBLEMS WITH REMEDYING DISCRIMINA nON WITH 
COMPENSATION 
A LOlV Compensation Awards 
Commentators note that compensat!9n awards in discrimination 
complaints in Australia tend to be low/' particularly in comparison to 
74 King v Nike Australia Pty Lld, [2007] VCAT 70; Forest v Queensland Health [2007] 
FCA 1236. 
75 Forest v Queensland Health [2007] FCA 936, [163]. 
76 Ibid, [19]. 
77 See eg New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Review of the Anti-Discrimination 
Act 1977. Repo11 No. 92 (1999), n 30. Ronalds states that very few claims for 
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awards in sexual harassment complaints, or compensation is non-
existent.78 This is illustrated in Table 1, which contains the median 
and average compensation awards made in discrimination complaints 
under the four Commonwealth anti-discrimination statutes79 and in 
sexual harassment complaintsSO from Apri12000 to August 2009.81 
Table 1: Commonwealth Compensation Awards 
RDASZ SDA DDA ADA") Sexual Harassment 
Average S30.813.21 S42.042.24 SI9.002.70 - S37.696.63 
Median S20.533.25 SIO.OOO.OO S 8.000.00 - SI5.000.00 
The compensation awards in Table 1 are not substantially different 
than those in Figure 3, particularly the median amount, which 
suggests that compensation awards are consistent across these 
jurisdictions and over different timeframes. vVhat is noteworthy about 
Table 1 is that the median and average sexual harassment awards are 
much higher than the median and average compensation awards in a 
discrimination complaint. The exception is the sample of RDA 
complaints, which is somewhat inflated because it includes six 
compensation awards for discriminatory 'wage payments.s" 
economic loss. such as for a period of unemployment related to unlawful 
discrimination, have resulted in awards of more than S50,000, while claims for non-
economic loss, such as for injury to feelings, arc usually amounts of between S8.000-
S20,000: Chris Ronalds, Discrimination Lall' and Practice (2008). 222-223. For a 
relatively recent list of awards sec ibid 224-225. 
78 Gaze reports that in the years 2000 - 2005 the federal eourts awarded damages in only 
onc complaint of racial discrimination (Carr I' Boree Aboriginal Corp [2003] FMCA 
408, in which the complainant was non-Indigenous and the respondent was an 
Indigenous corporation): Beth Gaze, 'Has the Racial Discrimination Act Contributed 
to Eliminating Racial Discrimination? Analysing the Litigation Track Record 2000-04' 
(2005) 11(1) Australian Journal of Human Rights 171, 186, 189. 
79 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) ('RDA'); Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) 
(,SDA'); Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) ('DDA'); Age Discrimination Act 
2004 (Cth) ('ADA'). 
80 SDA. Division 3. 
81 AHRC, Federal Discrimination Lalt' (2008). 337-369. The Commission regularly 
publishes online updates. See <http://www.humanrights.gov.aullegal/FDLlindex.html> 
at 21 August 2009. 
82 Figures include the six compensation awards in Baire! I' Queensland (No 2) [2006] 
FCAFC 198 which were awarded to compensate for racially discriminatory wage 
payments made to Aboriginal complainants in 1975 1986. The median and average 
arc calculated as though they were six separate awards, rather than as the total award. 
Without including these awards. the RDA figures are similar to the SDA and DDA: the 
average is S20,159.75 and the median is S 12,250. 
83 At the time ofwliting, compensation had not been ordered in an ADA complaint. 
84 See Baire! v Queensland (No 2) [2006] FCAFC 198. 
Remedying Discrimination: The Need for a Systemic Approach 
The samples of compensation awards from various jurisdictions over 
different timeframes suggest that compensation is awarded at low 
amounts and that awards in discrimination cases are less than sexual 
harassment cases. One reason is that in a discrimination complaint) 
compensation is intended to be compensatory, not punitive.s) 
However, based on the case analysis above, at present awards cannot 
be considered compensatory if the complainant cannot cover their 
legal fees, let alone redress the harm that they have suffered. Another 
reason is that courts have determined that compensation is assessed 
on tort principles,86 although the legislation does not contain such 
guidance. Thus, compensation is intended to put the complainant in 
the situation th_ey would have been in but for the act of unlawful 
discrimination,S, not to punish the respondent. ss Part of the 
explanation for low compensations awards in this jurisdiction may be 
that the cases that reach the courts are not cases that are likely to 
receive high a-wards. Without comparing the facts and evidence of 
settled complaints with decided cases, it is not possible to determine 
this. 
Two conclusions can be drawn, however. First, as described above, 
low compensation awards may encourage the complainant to settle 
earlier to prevent their compensation award from dissipating in legal 
fees, particularly as complainants are not regularly awarded costs. 
Second, compensation awards of modest amounts do little to deter 
potential respondents. One Victorian representative referred to 
companies that set aside funds in their risk management budget to 
ensure that they can cover discrimination complaints. It is 
acknowledged that this is part of prudent risk management practices, 
but it also suggests that the companies know that they can afford to 
cover a discrimination complaint if one is made. This indicates that 
the cost of doing something about the situation versus the risk of 
having to pay a few thousand dollars in compensation means that 
there is no incentive for companies to ensure that they are compliant 
with the legislation: they can treat the symptoms and ignore the root 
cause. 
B Compensation is not a Systemic Remedy 
The data presented in this article suggests that Australian courts have 
relinquished their ability to address other instances of discrimination 
by remedying the few successful complaints before them with 
compensation. This includes those jurisdictions that include wider 
remedies in their legislation which could affect similar conduct or 
deter would-be discriminators. Clearly, the law must ensure that the 
85 [n Clarke v Catholic Education Office (2003) 202 ALR 340_ 360 Madgwick J said 
'[d]amages are compensatory and no more'. 
86 Hall v A & A Sheiban Pty Lld (J 989) 20 FCR 217. 
87 Haines v Bendall (1991) 172 CLR 60, 63. 
88 Commonwealth v Evans (2004) 81 ALD 402, [80]. Tasmania is the exception. The 
Tribunal can order the respondent to pay 'a specified fine not exceeding 20 penalty 
units': ADAT, s 89(l)(c). 
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complainant receives a remedy for the behaviour they were subjected 
to. In some instances, compensation may be appropriate. For 
example, reinstatement will not always be suitable in an employment 
discrimination complaint or it may not be possible due to the time 
that has elapsed once the case is heard. In that instance, compensation 
for lost earnings is appropriate. However, there are complaints which 
lend themselves to a change in policy or practice, such as a disability 
access complaint. In that situation, compensation does not solve the 
central problem; it requires an actual change to access. This illustrates 
the primary problem with compensation: the payment of money does 
not address other instances of discrimination in society or achieve 
systemic change. Compensation is reactive. It does not encourage 
compliance because the respondent is not required to take 
anticipatory action to prevent another complaint. Nor is the 
respondent required to take any action to address the circumstances of 
similarly situated individuals. Once they have paid compensation, the 
respondent has fulfilled their obligation. 
C Systemic Remedies 
The examination of the Victorian experience and the comparison with 
remedies ordered in Queensland and federally suggests that courts are 
not regularly ordering systemic remedies. Ii1 ord'er to make a more 
precise assessment, it is necessary to consider the incidence of 
systemic orders in other jurisdictions and over a longer timeframe. 
This section considers whether Australian courts order an apology, 
which elevates the respondent's behaviour out of the private sphere, 
or wider, systemic orders, which would affect similarly situated 
people, such as changes to policies and practice or access to services.89 
In two of the cases presented in Figure 3, the complainant sought an 
apology which was not ~ranted. One case was heard by VCA T, the 
other was a federal case: ) Neither jurisdiction has a specific power to 
order an apolo3X' although the Federal Court has ordered them on 
other occasions 1 and VCAT ordered an apology in a vilification 
89 This discussion is only conccmed with whether courts are willing to order such 
remedies. It is acknowledged that parties may voluntmily agree to wider remedies if 
complaint is settled prior to heming. Training, a reference and an apology are the most 
common outcome sought: see Alien, above n 6, from 788. Sce also ADAT. s 104 
which provides that respondents are obliged to ensure that its members. officers, 
employees and agents are aware of the legislation and take reasonable steps to ensure 
that they do not engage in discrimination. 
90 King \. Nike Australia Pty Ltd, [2007] VCAT 70; Forest v Queensland Health [2007] 
FCA 1236. 
91 Forbes v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] FM CA 140; Escobar \. Rainbow Printing 
Pty Ltd (No 2) [2002] FMCA 122; Oberoi I' HlIman Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission [2001] FMCA 34; Cooke v Plallen Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] FMCA 91. 
The then Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (now known as the 
AHRC) also ordered apologies when it was responsible for adjudication: McDonald v 
Hospital Superannuation Board (1999) EOC 93-025; BlIlI & Anor v KlIch & Anor 
(J 993) EOC 92-518. 
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complaint.92 In some jurisdictions, the court has a specific power to 
order an apology93 but it is also difficult to obtain one in those 
jurisdictions. The Northern Territory Anti-Discrimination 
Commissioner has not ordered an apology. An apology has been 
ordered in a discrimination complaif!t once in New South \iVales9-1 
and on two occasions in Queensland.9) An examination of the decided 
cases shows that tribunals are more likely to order an aJ?ology in a 
vilification complaint96 or a sexual harassment complaint. ' The cases 
suggest that courts are reluctant to order the respondent to do 
something that they have not done voluntarily. In O'lVei1J v Steiler, 
the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Tribunal declined to order an 
apology and said that 'an apology not meant ... would not be an 
apology at all'.9s Similarly, the Fede~al Court has said that a court 
ordered apology serves little purpose.9 ) 
Australian courts appear to be reluctant to make wider orders which 
would affect people other than the parties. Although the Federal 
Court has said that the orders specified in s 46PO(4) of the AI-IRC 
Act are not exhaustive and that it has the power to make other 
orders, lOO since 2000, there are few examples of the Court ordering 
remedies other than compensation. 101 The Federal Court ordered a 
club to permit a complainant to access its premises with his dog, an 
assistance animal, unleashed;loc reinstatement and a variation in work 
hours to allow a complainant to collect her child from school; 103 and a 
complainant to proceed to the second stage of the respondent's 
92 Islamic Council o.f Victoria v Catch the Fire Ministries Inc [2004] YCAT 2510. 
93 ADAQ, s 209(1); ADANT, s 89; ADANSW. s 108(2)(d). 
94 Halliwell v Stephens & Bradley tlas Sirens Nightclub (1998) fOC 92-914. 
95 Bel/am)' v McTal'ish & Pine Rivers Shire Council [2003] QADT 15; Bishop l' Gedge & 
Rudd [2008] QADT 17. 
96 See eg Islamic Council o.f Victoria \. Catch the Fire Ministries lnc [2004] YCAT 2510; 
lones v Scul/y (2002) 120 FCR 243; Men:::ies & Ors v Owen [2008] QADT 20; Wilson 
& lvfcCol/ulll v Lawson & Anor [2008] QADT 27. 
97 Sce eg Zheng v Beamish [2004] FM CA 61; Styles v Murray Meats Pty Ltd [2005] 
YCAT914. 
98 o Neill v Steiler [1994] QADT 2. See also Lynton v lv1augeri and Queensland Anti-
Discrimination COlllmission [1995] QADT 3; Sailor v Vii/age Taxi Cabs Pty Ltd and 
Markwick [2004] QADT 15. 
99 See Forest v Queensland Health. [2007] FCA 1236; Travel'S v Nell' South Wales 
(2001) 163 FLR 99: Evans l' National Crime AlIIhorit)" [2003] FMCA 375; GWlla v 
Qantas Airways Ltd (No.2) [2006] FMCA 1767, [132]. This was also the view of Hely 
J in a vilification complaint. In Jones v Scully, Hely J said 'prima facie. the idea of 
ordering someone to make an apology is a contradiction in terms': above n 96, 308. In 
Grulke v KC Canvas Pty Lld [2000] FCA 1415, Ryan J said it was inappropriate to 
order apology as the respondent was a corporation, not natural person. 
100 McGlade \. Ligh!foot (2002) 124 FCR 106. [80]. The court has the power to make 
'such orders ... as it thinks fit': AHRC Act. s 46PO(4). 
101 See further AHRC. above n 81. 372-376. 
102 Sheehan v Tin Call Bay Country Club [2002] FMCA 95. 
103 Song v A ins worth Game Technology Pty Ltd [2002] FMCA 31. 
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employment application process.lO-l In a race discrimination 
complaint, the Court declined to order the respondent to make a 
donation to the Aboriginal Advancement Council and said the relief 
granted should be proportionat~ to the reasonably likely 
consequences of the unlawful act. IO) There is one example of the 
Federal Court ordering a wider remedy which affects other similarly 
situated individuals. The court ordered a council to construct wash 
basins that were out of public view in a toilet facility after it found that 
providing wash basins outside the toilet facility indirectly 
discriminated against persons with disabilities.106 
In Bonella & Ors v vVollongong City Council, the New South \Vales 
Administrative Decisions Tribunal declined to order the respondent 
to change its policies because, it said, such an order would have 
significant consequences for numerous people and its extent may be 
unclear. Instead, the Tribunal said 'the respondent should be given an 
opportunity to consider the impact of this decision and to set about 
devising and implementing a non-discrimination policy.'lOi 
Similarly, in Towie v State of Victoria, the complainant lodged a 
disability discrimination complaint after the state failed to 
accommodate his hearing impairment, meaning he was unable to 
participate in another case in the Magistrates Court. I08 Although 
VCA T dismissed the complaint for reasons unrelated to this 
discussion,109 Deputy President McKenzie noted that the decision 
illustrates the limitations of the EOAV because the complainant 
sought a policy change, namely R"reater access to justice for disabled 
persons, rather than a remedy. I 0 Implicit in her decision was that 
Deputy President McKenzie did not regard the EOA V as the 
appropriate vehicle for achieving a wider outcome. Instead, she urged 
the government to consider implementing appropriate policies to 
achieve greater access to justice. I [ 
However, if equality of 0fPortunity is taken at its broadest, then the 
law's objective is socia change. It follows that implementing 
structural change, such as Mr Towie sought, is the precise purpose of 
anti-discrimination law. vVhile some commentators are doubtful 
about whether the law can actually change social structures,112 in the 
\04 Vickers v The Ambulance Service of NSW [2006] FM CA 1232. 
[05 Mc Glade v Ligh(foot, (2002) 124 FCR 106, [90). 
\06 Access For All Alliance (Hervey Bay) fnc v Hervey Bay City Council [2004] FMCA 
915. 
\07 POOl] NSW ADT 194, [123). As discussed in Part V, the South African courts arc far 
more willing to make orders for staff training and audits of policies and procedures. 
108 [2007) VCAT 1489. 
\09 Deputy President McKenzie found that court staff were immune from elaims under the 
EOAY: ibid [16]. 
110 Ibid[24). 
III Ibid [33). 
112 See eg Laurence Lustgarten, 'Racial Inequality and the Limits of the Law' (1986) 49 
The Modem Law Review 68; Derriek A Bell, 'Racial Realism' (1992) 24 Connecticut 
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past, courts were more willing to try. Notable examples of systemic 
orders made in Australia were discussed in Part n. The South African 
courts offer recent examples, as discussed in Part V, including an 
order against three government departments requiring them to make 
all courts accessible to people with a disability.ll3 It seems that 
recently, Australian courts have shied away from remedying unlawful 
conduct in a systemic way and by doing so, the law is prevented from 
achieving its stated goal. 
Having determined that remedying discrimination with compensation 
poses the aforementioned problems for eradicating discrimination in 
society, the remainder of the article presents an alternative approach 
- requiring courts to make a systemic order in addition to remedying 
the individual complainant's experience. 
D introducing a Systemic Approach in Australia 
The complainant's primary concern, quite rightly, will be to remedy 
their own experience. They should not be expected to carry the 
burden of attempting to eradicate discrimination. That is the role of 
other institutions. It is for the court to make wide orders and for the 
equality commission to educate the community. I H As this article is 
concerned with the role of courts in remedying discrimination, it does 
not consider the role other institutions play in this process. 
To tackle discrimination effectively, the law needs to look beyond the 
individual parties to a discrimination complaint. This article proposes 
to modify Australian anti-discrimination laws in the following ways to 
achieve this: requiring the court to make an order which is aimed at 
addressing the wider issue of discrimination in addition to addressing 
the complainant's experience; including broad remedies in the 
legislation that extend beyond the individual parties and target other 
instances of discrimination; and, so that the court does not consider 
itself restricted by the orders specified in the legislation, including a 
'catch-all' power so that the court can make any other order it deems 
appropriate to the circumstances of the complaint. 
Part V presents the principles of interpretation and the extensive 
remedies contained in South Africa's anti-discrimination legislation to 
illustrate this type of approach. This discussion does not attempt to 
conduct a comparative analysis of anti-discrimination law in South 
Law Review 363: Roger Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law An Introduction (Oxford 
University Press, 2nd ed., 1992). 
I I3 See below n 143. 
114 One of the equality commissions' tasks is education. By doing so, potential 
respondents will be aware of the orders that made be made against them if they 
continue to behave discriminatorily. This also informs potential complainants who can 
see the law 'in action'. When asked why the Equality Commission for NorthemIreland 
publishes the outcomes of the complaints it assists complainants to resolve, Mary 
Kitson explained 'if we publish outcomes of our cascs people know. "oh that happened 
to me, I should complain".' Interview with Mary Kitson, Senior Lcgal Officer, 
Equality Commission for Northcm Ireland (Belfast, 25 Scptember 2007). 
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Africa. Rather, the remedies provision is presented to show how the 
problems identified in this article could be addressed by introducing a 
mechanism from a modern anti-discrimination statute. Examples 
drawn from cases and academic writing are supplemented by 
interviews conducted with South African scholars and staff at the 
South African Human Rights Commission. 
It is acknowledged that imposing a positive requirement on courts to 
impose a wider order that will tackle the cause of discrimination is a 
radical approach but if the law is to effectively address discrimination 
and promote equality of opportunity, as was intended, such an 
approach is necessary. As the discussion in Part In established, even 
courts in those jurisdictions which have the power to make wider 
orders are not doing so; discrimination is predominantly remedied 
with compensation. Of the possible explanations for this, a likely one 
is the law's restrictive conceptual understanding of discrimination. As 
examined in Part I, the law is structured around the individual and a 
singular act. The law assumes that discrimination is a single act 
perpetrated against an individual victim and that it is an unconscious, 
isolated event. It does not acknowledge that discrimination is a 
manifestation of entrenched behaviour. Therefore, discrimination is 
remedied by attending to the individual manifestation, not the root 
cause. Imposing a positive obligation would ensure that courts 
consider the wider ramifications and systemic aspects of the case. 
'Whether they choose a minimal approach that still meets this 
obligation will be up to the individual judge to decide. Others may 
choose to take advantage of the new remedies at their disposal and 
make systemic orders. Courts in South Africa have chosen the latter 
approach, as this section examines. Similarly, the purpose of including 
a 'catch-all' power is so that the court does not consider itself 
restricted by the remedies specified in the legislation. The court can 
either order a remedy stipulated in the legislation or devise a remedy 
to suit the circumstances of the case. The legislation's interpretive 
provisions, as described below, will guide the court in devising an 
appropriate remedy. 
V OVERVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICAN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION 
LAW 
It is trite to say that the post-apartheid government in South Africa 
was committed to equality, but it was because of this commitment 
that it introduced a range of legal measures which situate equality at 
the heart of the new democracy. For example, 'equality' is the first 
right protected in the South African Constitution 115 and the 
Constitution prohibits discrimination by the state and private persons 
on a range of listed grounds. 1I6 South African anti-discrimination law 
benefited from the experience of other countries. Legislative drafters 
115 COl1stilUtiol1 of the Repllblic o.l'Sollth Africa Act No 108 of 1996, s 9. 
116 lbid, s 9(3), (4). This is now regulated by legislation. as discussed below. 
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consciously tried to avoid some of the problems that have plagued 
other countries in relation to the burden of proof and defining 
discrimination ll7 and provided courts with an extensive range of 
remedies, as described below. Discrimination complaints are dealt 
with according to whether or not they relate to employment. This 
article is concerned with the Promotion of E~uaJjty and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act ('PEPUDA'), I! which regulates non-
employment related discrimination on a range of grounds. 1l9 The 
South African Human Rights Commission ('SAHRC') handles 
complaints made under PEPUDA or complaints can be litigated in 
the Equality Courts,120 which is a less formal setting than a traditional 
civil court. 121 
A Interpretive Principles 
Not only does PEPUDA contain extensive remedies, it also contains 
interpretive provisions which clearly state that remedies are not only 
referable to the parties; they are to be used to eradicate discrimination 
and promote equality. PEPUDA includes guiding principles which 
are to be applied in adjudication. The most relevant principle to this 
discussion is that the court must use 'corrective or restorative 
measures in conjunction with measures of a deterrent nature'. I:!:! This 
is strengthened by the requirement that '[t]he existence of systemic 
discrimination and inequalities' and 'the need to take measures at all 
levels to eliminate such discrimination and inequalities' are to be 
taken into account when applying the Act. m The extensive remedies 
in PEPUDA were included to overcome the limitations other 
countries have experienced in ordering appropriate remedies in 
117 Ockcrt Dupper, 'Proving Indircct Discrimination in Employment: A South African 
View' (2000) 21 Industrial Law Journal 747, 769: Chlistoph Garbers, 'Proof and 
Evidence of Employment Discrimination under the Employment Equity Act 55 of 
1998' (2000) 12 South Aji-ican j\Iercantile Law Journal 136: Anton Kok, 'The 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act: Why the 
Controversy?' (2001) Journal of South Aji'icGl/ Law 294. 
118 ActNo4of2000. 
119 Employment related complaints arc regulated by the Employment Equity Act No 55 of 
1998 (South Africa) ('EEA(SAn and litigated in the Labour Courts. 
120 Every High Court is designated as an Equality Court automatically. Magistrates Courts 
are designated onee they have the necessary personnel and resources in place and the 
courts' judges and clerks have completed training in equality and diversity: PEPUDA, 
s 16-17. 
121 See further Philippa Lane, South A/i-ica's Equality Courts: An Ear~l' Assessment, 
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (2005) 
<http://www.csvLorg.za/papcrs/paprctp5.htm> at 8 March 2007; Namia Bohler-
Muller, 'The Promise of Equality Courts' 22(3) South Aji-ican Journal on Human 
Rights 380. 
l22 PEPUDA, s 4( I led). 
123 Ibid, s 4(2). 
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discrimination mattersY-I Staff at the SABRC said that they see the 
goal of PEPUDA as harmonising the community and changing 
attitudes, not penalising people. 12 ) This is supported by the Act's 
objectives which include 'the promotion of equality' and to provide 
measures to 'facilitate the eradication of unfair discrimination' and 
'educate the public and raise public awareness on the im~ortance of 
promoting equality and overcoming unfair discrimination'. 26 
B Available Remedies 
The broad remedies provided in PEPUDA are worth stating in full to 
show the imaginative remedies introduced in a recent piece of anti-
discrimination legislation. An Equality Court can make an 
appropriate order: 
• for the payment of damages to an appropriate organisation; 
to restrain the unfair discrimination; 
to make available specific opportunities and privileges unfairly 
denied to the complainant; 
• for special measures; 
for the reasonable accommodation of a group or class; 
that an unconditional apology is made; 
that the respondent undergoes an audit of specific policies or 
practices; 
• of a deterrent nature; 
to require the respondent to make regular process reports to 
the court regarding the implementation of the court's 
order. l2 ; 
In the case of a persistent contravention or an instance of systemic 
discrimination, the court may refer the respondent to another 
124 Sandra Licbcnbcrg and Michcllc O·Sullivan. 'South AfIica's Ncw Equality Lcgislation 
A Tool for Advancing Women's Socio-Economic Equality?' (2001) Acta Juridica 70, 
101. 
125 '[TJhc intention is for thc community to change its pcrception about cach other. I 
cannot go to thc Equality Court to raise funds. I should say, I'm going there so that my 
fcllow South AfIiean should lcarn that this is not the way you treat othcr people.' 
Intervicw with staff at the South African Human Rights Commission (Johanncsburg, 9 
October 2007). Scc also Parliamcntary MonitOling Group, Report on Hearings 
Conducted by the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitllfional Developmelll on 
the Occasion a/the Review by the Parliament a/South A.fi"ica on Aspects a/Equality in 
Our Society (2006), 9.2. 
126 PEPUDA. ss 2(b)(ii), (c), (c). 
127 Ibid s 21 (2). 
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institution, such as the SAHRC, for further investigation. 128 The 
court is not limited by this list. 129 It can also order injunctive relief1 30 
and an interdict,131 which is a form of injunction. 
C Examples of Remedies Ordered in South Aji-ica 
Professor Cathi Albertyn conducted some of the judicial training 
sessions on PEPUDA. She recalled that initially members of the 
judiciary were unsure about some of the remedies,' particularly paying 
damages to an appropriate organisation and of the idea of ordering 
someone to apologise.132 Two early cases helped to establish that 
systemic orders are part of the process of remedying discrimination. 
In a case that received much media attention,b3 the Chair of the 
SAHRC, lody Kollapen, personally lodged a complaint at an Equality 
Court after the Commission received a complaint about a barber in 
Pretoria refusing to cut non-'white' hair. \iVhen Kollapen, who is of 
Indian heritage, visited the barber, he was also refused a haircut, 
hence his complaint.1H Kollapen's complaint was successful and the 
Equality Court order included a public apology, that the respondent 
cease the discrimin~~ory practice, training and payment to a charity of 
Kollapen's choice. b) Professor Albertyn said that partly due to the 
publicity the case received, such broad orders were accepted as part of 
the terms of settlement of discrimination matters and have not been 
in dispute. 136 
The second case is the first discri~ination complaint heard by an 
Equality Court. Pillay, a 'coloured,13; male, was turned away from a 
128 lbid s 21(3). 
129 Note the use of the word 'including': ibid s 21(2). 
130 Ibid s 21(2)(a)(b). 
131 Ibid s 21 (5). 
132 Interview with Professor Cathi Albertyn. Director. Centre for Applied Legal Studies, 
University of the Witwatcrsrand (Johannesburg, 10 October 2007). Ntlama shares the 
judges' reservation: 'What would the order of apology do to somebody who hasn't 
shown any remorse for his [sic] actions?' Nomthandazo Ntlama, 'The Equality Act: A 
Tool for Social Change in Promoting Gender Equality' (Paper presented at the Law 
Society of the N0!1hem Provinces Conference on The Improvement of the Quality of 
Life, Status, Justice and Constitutional Development of Women, Pretoria, South 
Africa, 1-2 August. 2006) 
<http://www.saifac.org.za/docs/res-..papers/RPS%20No.%2023.pdf> at 11 November 
2008. 
133 Sce eg 'Call to Close "Whites-Only" Barber', BBC News, 22 October 2003; , "Whites 
Only" Barber Sued in SA', BBC News. 20 October 2003. See also SAHRC 'SAHRC 
Chairperson in Barbershop Equality Court Case' (Media Release, date unknown), 
available at <www.sahrc.org.za> at 26 February 2008. 
134 Prior to the hearing, local journalists covering the story visited the barber and reported 
the same experience: ibid. 
135 Edwin Naidu. 'Equality C01ll1S arc Crying Out for Work'. The Sunday independent 
(South Africa), 10 April 2005, 7. 
136 Albel1yn, above n 132. 
137 During apartheid, South Africans were classified by race into four broad groups, 
specifically 'white', 'coloured', 'Indian' and 'African'. See the Population 
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bar, supposedly for being inappropriately dressed, while his 'white' 
partner was allowed in, although both were dressed comparably to the 
other patrons. 138 They lodged a complaint of race discrimination and 
,vere represented by the SAHRC.139 The matter was settled and the 
settlement was ratified as an order of the Equality Court. HO The order 
included the redrafting of the club's policies, an apology, and payment 
to a charity,!"! all of which are provided in s 21 (2) of PEPUDA. 
Broad remedies continue to be ordered bv South African courts, 
including by the country's highest court. I~ the first case appealed 
from an Equality Court to the Constitutional Court, the 
Constitutional Court ordered a school to amend its dress code to 
reasonably accommodate the complainant's cultural practices after it 
found the school had unfairly discriminated against her. H2 
EPUDA also contains systemic remedies - audits, special measures 
and interdicts - and empowers the court to order a respondent to 
report back to the court on their progress in implementing systemic 
remedies. H3 Systemic remedies have not been used extensively in 
discrimination complaints to dateH-I although the SAHRC has 
obtained systemic orders in discrimination complaints it has litigated. 
For example, the SAHRC obtained an order against three 
government departments that they make all courts accessible to 
people with a disability within five years and that the departments 
provide ~he court and the SAHRC with six monthly progress 
reports. H) The Constitutional Court has made systemic orders in 
Registration Act 1959 (South Africa) (rcpcaled 1991). Thesc telms are still used in 
contemporary legislation. See eg EEA(SA), sI. 
138 PiIlay v De Vas \. Silver Club (2004) Cape Town Equality Court, Western Cape. 
139 Lane, above n 121, 21. 
!40 PiIlay v De Vas v Silver Club (2004) Cape Town Equality Coul1, Western Capc. 
Ratification of scttlcments by the coul1 is providcd in PEPUDA: s 21 (2)( c). 
141 Ibid. 
142 MECjor Education: Kwazulu-Natal and Others v Pillay (CCT 51/06) [2007] ZACC 
21. 
143 The Silver Club case was closely followed by Mkhi::e l' Edgemead High School. Blue 
Downs Equality Court. Western Cape. The order included an unconditional apology, 
payment to another body, in this case a creche, an audit of the respondcnt high school's 
policies and practices, and that the respondents attend a diversity and racial 
sensitisation training program as arranged by the SAHRC. The coul1 ordered the 
SAHRC to monitor the order's implementation: Lane. above n 12 1,28. 
144 Albertyn, above n 132. Similarly, Anton Kok said that he had found most equality 
cases are direct discrimination complaints by individuals, so damages arc usually 
awarded: Interview with Dr Anton Kok, University of Pretoria (Phone interview, 
Johannesburg, 12 October 2007). 
145 Repol1ed in SAHRC, Annual Report (2006). 27. 
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other m_atters,146 including in complaints relating to socio-economic 
rights,l't, so this jurisprudence may influence equality matters. 
The discussion of remedies in South African anti-discrimination law 
shows that another legislature has been willing to make broad 
remedies available to courts in discrimination complaints. Moreover, 
courts are willing to make those orders. In fact, such orders have 
become an accepted part of remedying discrimination, including by 
the country's highest court. Australian law would be strengthened if it 
contained such orders, along with interpretive provisions about their 
use and purpose to guide their application. 
VI CONCLUSION 
Australian courts primarily remedy discrimination with compensation, 
even when extensive remedies are available to them. An analysis of the 
remedies ordered in successful discrimination complaints in Victoria, 
Queensland and federally revealed that if a complainant successfully 
proves discrimination, compensation is likely to be the only remedy 
ordered. Compensation awards are comparatively low and may not 
even cover the complainant's legal fees. This article argued that that 
the courts' preference for compensation means that nothing is being 
done to address other instances of discrimination because the 
respondent is not required to take any action to address wider 
problems. It proposed that courts should be required to make a wider 
order in addition to remedying the complainant's experience. The 
legislation should contain a range of orders, including a 'catch-all' 
power, so that the court can fashion a remedy around the particular 
circumstances of the case. By doing this, not only will the law remedy 
the individual complainant's experience, it will also target other 
instances of discrimination of which the complainant's experience is 
just the 'tip of the iceberg'. 
This article considered only one part of the complaint resolution 
process. Courts hear a small proportion of discrimination complaints; 
the overwhelming majority are settled or withdrawn prior to hearing. 
In Victoria, representatives report that compensation is also the 
principal outcome negotiated prior to hearing but at much higher 
amounts than courts .i\yard. H8 To paint a complete picture of how 
discrimination is remedied in Australia, data needs to be collected 
from the equality commissions to determine whether the settlement 
experience differs from the remedies ordered by courts. Particular 
146 Sec cg August v Electoral Commission 1999 4 BCLR 363 (CC); Strydom v Minister of 
Correctional Services 1999 3 BCLR 342 (W). 
147 Sce eg Governmel1l of the Republic of South Aji-ica and Others l' Grootboom and 
Others (CCT38/00) [2000] ZACC 14; Minister for Health and Others v Treatmel1l 
Action Campaign and Others (CCT8/02) [2002] ZACC 15; Head of Departmel1l: 
J\1pu/llalanga Department of Education and Another v Hoerskool Ermelo and Another 
(CCT40/09) [2009] ZACC 32. 
148 Sec further Alien. above n 6. 784-786. 
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points of analysis may include whether the likelihood of a much lower 
compensation award is keeping complainants away from court, the 
type of outcomes negotiated at settlement and whether systemic 
remedies are negotiated. 
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